Sustainability standards are flooding global agricultural markets. Standards however, are not recent: standards for the exchange of grain and tropical products emerged in the 19th century. The objective of this article is to analyze, in a historical perspective, the implications of the transition from traditional standards to sustainability standards on the commoditization/de-commoditization process. We show how early standards and grades contributed to the construction of the category of products called primary commodities and how, after a short attempt at de-commoditization (with the early fair trade and organic standards), sustainability standards tend towards re-commoditization.
Of standards and commodities
From "bird-friendly coffee" to "ethical tea", through "sustainably certified forests", "sustainable palm oil", "eco-friendly pineapples", "responsible soy" or "better bananas", sustainability standards in the area of agricultural commodities are flooding global markets.
While traditional standards defined the identity of a product to be exchanged on international markets based on a set of physical attributes, sustainability standards provide detailed technical specifications setting social and environmental characteristics for the production process itself 1 , with a clear reference to the three pillars of sustainable development. The ambition to standardise the production process for agricultural products is not totally new, since organic and fair trade standards have been sharing this feature for over 30 years.
Sustainability standards differ from these pioneering initiatives not only through their principles, but also because they are supported by the main actors of the value chain (manufacturers, retailers, banks) that aim to create the new quality reference for mainstream agricultural product markets.
The objective of this article is to analyze in a historical perspective the implications of the transition from traditional to sustainability standards on the commoditisation/decommoditisation process. We call commoditisation, the process that gave birth to a specific category of goods called "primary commodities", clearly different from manufactured goods.
The construction of product homogeneity -a necessary condition for pure and perfect competition (Marshall, 1890) -is at the heart of the process of commoditisation 2 . Product homogeneity implies a high degree of similarity between the different batches of products sold on the market, and thus allows a high degree of substitutability between suppliers.
Product similarity and supplier substitutability depend mostly on the quality attributes considered in the transaction. Two batches of a given commodity -two bags of Robusta green coffee for example -are never absolutely identical if all the variables that can be used to describe them are taken into account. They can be identical regarding the size of the beans, but different regarding their colour. Similarity between batches and substitutability between suppliers supposes that market participants focus on some specific information regarding the quality (or the identity) of a commodity. If homogeneity, and therefore commoditisation, rests upon the production and exchange of information regarding a limited number of quality attributes, this means forgetting or neglecting even more information regarding specific quality attributes of a given batch (e.g. its geographical origin, the variety used, the planter's name, etc.). As a consequence, commoditisation is also supported by the creation and management of a certain degree of opacity between the upper and lower parts of the chain.
From this point of view, commoditisation illustrates the rationalization process at work in our modern society that supposes not only producing more and more information, but also discarding or ignoring information. In the agricultural sector, standards have been the main instrument of this rationalization process 3 (Beninger, 1986; Busch and Bingen, 2006; Hill, 1990) to the extent that we consider standardization and commoditisation as closely intertwined processes.
The commoditisation process can be split in two: (i) a day-to-day process that transforms an agricultural product harvested in a field into a primary commodity traded on world markets (testing, sorting, grading) ; (ii) a historical process that gave birth to the institutions necessary for the existence of primary commodities as a specific category of goods. It is this second process of commoditisation that we intend to investigate in this paper, mainly through a literature review. The current proliferation of sustainability standards has given a new impulse to the commoditisation/de-commoditisation debate. According to Kaplinsky (2006) , sustainability standards supported by certification, create new barriers to entry and therefore foster de-commoditisation. They should hence be considered as a development tool. We defend the opposite position: by reintroducing market relations and supplier substitutability, sustainability standards and the associated certification practices tend towards recommoditisation. To understand this involves going back to the core logic of commoditisation.
The paper is organised in three sections. The first section presents an account of the emergence of standards in the agricultural sector in the 19 th century. It underlines the relationship that exists between standardization and commoditisation, and the evolution of these notions through time. Early standards and grades contributed to the construction of the category of products called primary commodities (homogeneous products for a given grade that may be supplied by interchangeable suppliers). The second section details two initiatives:
organic agriculture aimed at promoting alternative production methods, and fair trade aimed at promoting social relations. These initiatives entailed the construction of vertically integrated chains tailored for differentiated products. By making it possible for retailers and consumers to trace their products all the way back to identifiable producers or producer organisations, these initiatives contributed to the effective de-commoditisation of agricultural products (even though this was not a stated objective of these initiatives). Beyond the debate regarding fair trade and organic agriculture, the third section addresses recent developments in the area of sustainability standards (proprietary standards, standards developed by environmental and social NGO standards, multi-stakeholder commodity initiatives). We defend the idea that these standards are used to differentiate products at the consumer level, to avoid blame and to protect one's brand, while ensuring a regular supply of sustainable products provided by anonymous certified producers. This brings us to consider the emergence and diffusion of sustainability standards as a new phase in the commoditisation process of agricultural products. In the conclusion, we investigate the implications of this process on development and discuss the impact of sustainability standards on value distribution along the chains. This leads us to consider complementary policy measures to ensure a positive contribution of sustainability standards to development.
The genesis of historical standards
Until the last quarter of the 19 th century, goods were mainly judged by direct physical contact with the buyer. Each buyer had his own criteria for evaluating the quality of goods and the degree to which they matched his requirements. In the process, several senses were used:
touch, sight, smell and taste (even for rubber). Products were also identified according to their geographical origin, but the criterion used to define the geographical origin varied considerably. Grades and standards for agricultural products emerged in the second part of the 19 th century (Cronon, 1991; Daviron, 2002; Daviron and Ponte, 2005) . This process was closely linked with the birth of futures markets. Both institutions appeared first in the grain trade in Chicago. They are clearly "products" of the United States' phase and model of capitalism.
Innovations in grains
Cronon (1991) offers a fascinating account of the historical process that led to the creation of grain standards and the Chicago Board of Trade. Until the middle of the 19 th century, grains (mostly corn and wheat) produced by the prairie farmers were sold in New Orleans or in the cities of the East Coast under a marketing system that was similar to the one developed for overseas products. Ownership rights over the grain remained with the original shipper until it reached the point of final sale. A commission merchant organised the transportation, storage and sale of the grain and sometimes provided credit and insurance to the shipper. The grain was transported by river in sacks and remained untouched from the farm to the flour mill. The first impulse for change came from the expansion of railroads. Grain flows were reoriented from Saint Louis and New Orleans to Chicago and the Great Lakes. New incentives to achieve 'economies of speed' appeared. The response to these incentives was the development of a specific technical innovation: built in the 1850s, the steam-powered grain elevator changed the whole organisation of marketing. The ability to handle and transport grain without the use of sacks and to mix grains from several farmers in a bin of an elevator meant that the ownership could not remain with the farmer during handling and transport as before. Here the response was institutional rather than technical, and led to the creation of the first standard by the Chicago Board of Trade -a voluntary association of grain traders aimed at promoting the city and at dealing with the day-to-day problems of the grain market. In 1856, the Board created a uniform wheat standard for the city, based on three grades. This act was decisive for the re-organisation of the grain trade in the USA.
After 1848, the telegraph network enabled to synchronise price movements between Chicago (the hub of prairie grain supply) and the East Coast (its main consumer market against price fluctuations occurred along with a change in the way merchants operated: the latter increasingly bought grain on a cash basis rather than on consignment. Being protected against the risk of selling at a lower price than the price paid at purchase, the merchant could become the owner of the product and hold it for a long time. Because of this new ability, previously distant market transactions were suddenly brought close to small towns or even the farm gate. Subsequently, the necessity for the farmer to hold the product for months before selling disappeared. The distribution of samples of different cotton grades to the various local trading associations was supposed to guarantee the use of the standard (Brown, 1938) . Exchange were organised according to rules defining nine grades. Each grade was defined in relation to the number of defects. Grade N°7 was used as a basis for quotation and all other grades were judged in relation to it. No coffees with a grade lower than N°8 were allowed to be imported in the USA. The grading system made no reference to coffee aroma or to the geographical origin of the coffee.
The standardization of rubber started in 1913 with the founding of the London Rubber Trade
Association. This association set up a Standard Quality Committee during its first year of operation with the purpose of defining a standard and providing arbitration for sales concluded with reference to this standard. In 1928 however, the US Rubber Manufacturers Association published its own standard (Rondet, 1997) . Like the cotton standard, it was based on the distribution of sets of reference samples to the operators. It soon became the dominant standard in the market, reflecting the influence of US tire manufacturers in the international rubber market. This standard was subsequently renegotiated by producers, users and traders at conferences organised by the International Rubber Study Group. In 1952, these negotiations resulted in the so-called 'Green Book', a globally-agreed document defining the various smoked sheet and crepe 4 classes recognised in international trade. The first standard for cocoa was created in 1925 to enable the functioning of the New York futures market.
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The collective dimension of agricultural standards: from trader associations to State entities
The building of such agreements and the necessary funding to elaborate the associated technical knowledge raise a problem of collective action for the different users of the standard. Originally, trader associations supported such collective action. The Midwest merchants and the Chicago board of Trade offer the best example of this capacity for collective action (Odle, 1964) . In cocoa, standardization was initiated and driven by the public institutions that operated in the British and French colonies in Africa in the 1920s and 1930s. Inspections were initially organised to prevent exports of substandard cocoa. Simple classifications were created, with two or three categories of exportable cocoa (Viton, 1960) . One of the last standards to be "nationalised" is that of rubber, with the creation of the Standard Malaysian Rubber in 1965.
From then on -and for almost one century -the identity of an internationally traded batch of a commodity will be defined by its national origin and by a specific grade within the national standard. No further information will be necessary to sell and buy a product. No information will be given about the characteristics of the production process or the identity of the farmer and, in most cases, no information will even be provided about the regional origin within the country. In the absence of universal standards, market operators will work with a system of equivalencies between national origins -including premiums and discounts -in relation to the central market price, i.e. the price quoted on the main futures market. At the same time, a domestic standard was created to organise market transactions at the farm level. In some cases, the domestic standard defined the quality of the commodity prior to a first physical transformation: seed cotton before ginning, rubber cup lump before re-milling, etc. In other cases, the domestic standard defined the quality of the commodity prior to sorting and cleaning (cocoa, green coffee).
Standards for batch substitutability in space and time
The criteria for product characterization used in various standards remain extremely generic:
cleanliness and absence of damage (mould or insect damage) are the main variables considered. The different grades are defined according to the amount of impurities present in a sample (foreign matter or deteriorated product). The standard for sheet and crepe rubber laid down in the Green Book is limited solely to cleanliness. A further factor in the case of cocoa is the presence of slaty or violet beans indicating possibly inadequate fermentation and hence a potentially weak chocolate aroma. The general appearance and staple length of cotton is added to cleanliness criteria. These criteria allow simple methods of testing and product acceptance. Visual inspection is dominant, even though it might be preceded by a knife cut (the cut test for cocoa) or by stretching the product between the thumbs (pulling cotton). In this situation, product qualification is based mainly on the know-how of the person performing the visual inspection and does not require any special equipment.
The generic standards used to qualify tropical commodities are thus characterised on the one hand by the absence or minor role of processability criteria, and on the other hand by the absence of interest for their local specificities. Finally, these standards reflect the comparative weakness of the quality requirements of the user industries and, above all, the absence of demand for variety (indeed, standards were developed to define quality in a mass production economy). The reduction in the diversity that accompanied the creation of national standards can thus be seen as the 'price' that consumers paid for the development of low-cost smallscale production (in comparison to the costs incurred by large plantations).
In all cases, the standards provided very simple information about the intrinsic characteristic of the commodity (most often cleanliness), and no information at all about the production process implemented within the farm. Ignoring the conditions of production made it possible to resort to a great variety of production technologies for the supply of a single commodity.
Standards as a source of opacity Domestic and export standards organised competition between suppliers and smoothed market operations by acting as a curtain or a screen between the field and the fork. Nations and farms were "black boxes" that were totally opaque to the upper part of the chain. In the manufacturing sector, standardization is necessary to guarantee interchangeability, and interchangeability is necessary to guarantee compatibility between the different components in the assembly line. Although interchangeability is also a key issue for agricultural products, market transactions predominate. Premiums or penalties allow products coming from different places, times or agents to be interchanged, with no difficulty for the buyer or the seller. In other words, instead of being subordinated to the technical constraints of the assembly line, the definition of standards was subordinated to the constraint of the anonymous market transaction. Despite the technical recommendations provided by the engineers, the content of agricultural standards seemed to respond first to the merchants' needs. While industrial standards were primarily elaborated to reduce production costs within the factory, agricultural standards aimed at reducing transaction costs, and more specifically search costs (Shapiro, 1999) .
Fair trade and organic agriculture: from de-to re-commoditisation
The 1960s witnessed the development of new agricultural chains, with the organic agriculture and fair trade movements. Both initiatives explicitly encouraged and valued the differentiation of agricultural products, first through specific retailers and marketing chains, before promoting labelled products in mainstream chains (Raynolds, 2000) . Both initiatives clearly challenged the mainstream agro-food system: the generalised use of chemicals and pesticides, the poor quality of its final products, the distended nature of social relations between its actors, the inequalities generated at the local and the global levels, and the misuse of natural resources (Goodman, 2004; Marsden, 2000) . In other words, both initiatives proposed an alternative system based on "quality", "place" and "nature" (Goodman, 2003 (Goodman, , 2004 . Both initiatives were characterised by a high level of vertical integration that went all the way from marginalised or "different" producers and their organisations to dedicated retail shops. They also promoted new rules and production techniques that were completely disconnected from the mainstream, and expressed new concerns for the impacts of agriculture on the environment and on labour conditions (Renard, 2003) . Finally, both initiatives emphasised the importance of restoring trust between increasingly disconnected food consumers and producers (Morgan et al., 2006) .
Vertical integration as a means of greater transparency and debate
At the early stages, organic agriculture relied on a set of shared values and informal norms rather than on official criteria (Ingenbleek, 2007) . According to Sylvander (1997) , these informal norms were more social than technical. Product differentiation, trust and transparency were organised through specific marketing channels (peasant markets, specific brands, contract farming, local producer-consumer associations, and specialised health stores Because of the geographic distance, World Shops and their staff involuntarily acted as a first curtain between producers and consumers, despite their constant efforts towards "interknowledge" (ibidem). In the mid 1980s, the World Shops progressively became more professional. This can be explained by several factors, including: the inclusion of foodstuffs besides handicrafts; increasing demand; higher safety and quality standards and stronger competition from mainstream retailers (Littrell and Dickson, 1999; Gendron et al., 2009) . In
France, the Artisans du Monde (AdM) network exemplifies this evolution: the first AdM shop opened in Paris in 1974 and was followed by many more throughout the 1970s 6 . In 1984, despite valuing direct relations with producer organisations, AdM created a central importing company -Solidar'Monde -to rationalise the imports and warehousing of foodstuffs and crafts and to manage a larger pool of suppliers (ibidem). With Solidar'Monde, a second curtain was drawn between the consumer and the producer.
From idiosyncratic trading practices to common standards, labels and third party certification
The organic movement remained disconnected from the mainstream until the early 1990s, when consumer demand for organic products began to rise, as a consequence of : widely publicised food scares in Europe such as BSE, E. Colii and salmonella outbreaks, dioxincontaminated chicken, etc. (Gale, 2006) ; emerging consumer concerns over how food is produced; and decreasing public support to agriculture (Guthman, 2004) . Accompanying this trend, the creation of national organic standards, labels and certification practices in Europe Second, fair trade labelled products could hence be sold through conventional marketing channels, which substantially expanded the market for these products.
In the case of fair trade, certification contradicts and even poses a threat to the very principles of the movement: (a) with the reintroduction of competition enabled by certification, large scale plantations are likely to be privileged over groups of small and marginalised producers because they can afford high certification costs, and because they are able to deliver large and consistent volumes of products with a constant quality (Le Velly, 2007); (b) certification helps large corporate downstream actors control and switch between certified and hence substitutable suppliers 10 (Haan et al., 2003; Raynolds, 2004) ; and finally (c) by forbidding the inspectors from providing advice to the farmers whose practices they are monitoring 11 , third party certification may ultimately contribute to the exclusion of poor farmers (Mutersbaugh, 2004) . Ultimately, certification and labelling ensure the perfect substitutability of suppliers, while those unable to conform to the wishes of the buyer are excluded from the chain (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001).
Competing with conventional products over supermarket shelf space
Once confined to alternative marketing channels, certified fair trade and organic products compete today with conventional products on the same supermarket shelf-spaces.
Good economic prospects brought by the opening of the market have drawn a growing number of stakeholders (farmers, processors, retailers) to the organic business. Today, while the food industry overall is growing at approximately 1-2%, global organic sales have achieved double-digit annual growth for more than a decae (Giovannucci, 2006) . Global retail sales of organic foods were estimated at US$34 billion in 2005 and increased by over 200 % in less than a decade, from approximately US$11 billion in 1997 (Byers and Giovannucci, 2008) . The North American market is the most dynamic market worldwide, with retail sales of organic foods having increased up to $21.1 billion in 2008 from $3.6 billion in 1997 (Dimitri and Oberholtzer, 2009 ). In the USA, several studies show how initially small organic actors grew into larger companies that -because of their profitability -ultimately ended up in the hand of transnational corporations (TNCs) (Dimitri and Greene, 2002; Sligh and Christman, 2003; Clark, 2007) . In 2004, mainstream supermarkets accounted for 37 % of total organic food sales on the US market, followed by independent natural food stores (28 %) and natural food supermarket chains (19 %) (Martinez, 2007) . As organic sales in the conventional channels increased, many supermarkets (e.g. Safeway, Supervalu) began to produce their own corporate-brand organics (ibidem). In the competition between large downstream actors (e.g. food manufacturers and supermarkets), organic and fair trade labels are a powerful instrument of product differentiation and hence play a crucial role in capturing market share. Supermarkets sell today on their shelves manufacturers' fair trade certified brands next to their own-brand fair trade certified products, and progressively convert entire product lines to fair trade (Raynolds 2008; Smith, 2008) . Coffee perfectly illustrates such mixed strategies (Table 1) . One of the first fair trade agricultural products through solidarity trade with politically marginalised countries such as Nicaragua or Tanzania, coffee is today one of the flagship products of "corporate fair trade" 12 . Jaffee (2007) The early fair trade and organic agriculture movements both questioned the commodity status of agricultural products. By building strong vertical linkages between consumers and producers, these movements -which aimed at more transparency concerning technical and social production processes within food chains -ended anonymity and limited producer substitutability. The shift from labelled organisations to labelled products, characterized by the adoption of harmonised standards and the use of third-party certification, triggered major transformations. First, it brought organic and fair trade products onto supermarket shelves.
Second, it restored the distance in the trading relationship: yet another curtain was drawn between the consumer and the producer. Finally, by conciliating anonymity and transparency it reintroduced supplier substitutability. Although organic and fair trade products remain differentiated at the consumer level thanks to a label, although prices for organic and fair trade products are higher than conventional ones, although a certain degree of transparency has been achieved all the way to the consumer, we consider that commoditisation is on its way.
Sustainability standards: one step further towards commoditisation
The 1990s Table 2 presenting a chronology of the emergence of sustainability standards clearly shows the acceleration in the number of sustainability schemes over the past decade, and an evolution from multisectoral to crop-specific standards. Today, the adoption of standards promoted by NGOs and multistakeholder initiatives seem to be the two dominant strategies used by TNCs. This can be explained by the high costs generated by the creation, implementation and monitoring of proprietary standards: it might indeed be both less costly and more efficient in terms of image for large corporations such as Nestlé or McDonalds to resort to NGOs' expertise in the field of standard setting and certification than to develop their own -potentially less credible -certification scheme 15 . The simultaneous adoption of various strategies is not as awkward as it first seems: by adopting the sustainability standards created by NGOs that are more legitimate, TNCs try to avoid contestation, buy themselves an image of cleanliness and access niche markets with considerable margins. By creating sustainability standards with other firms of the same business, TNCs agree collectively around a new set of sustainability standards that will, in the end, determine who has access to the market and who does not. Finally, by creating sustainability standards with a wide array of actors, TNCs seek consensus and legitimate their actions, especially when prominent NGOs are involved.
The previously described sustainability standards share three common features. First, they are designed to ensure that TNCs have access to a pool of interchangeable suppliers (sharing desired technical specifications), while preventing potential price claims. Second, they are designed to ensure transparency regarding the social and environmental conditions of production, that is to inform actors located both inside (workers) and outside (shareholders, consumers, bankers, civil society, etc.) the firm of its initiatives in terms of sustainable development (procurement policy, labour policy, transportation policy, etc.). Third, they share a common signalling device: sustainability standards are monitored by third-party certifiers in charge of measuring and signalling performance outside the supply chain, and of ensuring supplier substitutability inside. The increasing role played by the third-party certification further contributes to reduce the relationships between buyers and suppliers.
According to Green (2005) , a general characteristic of sustainability standards is the "watering down", i.e. the dilution of the principles carried by the pioneers (organic agriculture and fair trade). Watering down, which seems to be a condition for the implication of the largest number of actors with different and even conflicting interests (concessions must be made within a context of negotiation), may result from the adoption of less stringent principles and criteria -the most frequent being price provisions. Among sustainability standards, only FLO and to a lesser extent Starbucks, explicitly grant producers price premiums. Utz Kapeh and Rainforest Alliance guarantee no price premium, although both initiatives affirm that certified products command higher prices, mainly because their quality is higher, thus reflecting free market forces. Business-to-business (B2B) standards -that are not meant to be communicated to the final consumer via a label -are becoming increasingly used (Henson, 2006) . These standards are used to organise the supply chain (Nadvi and Waltring, 2002; Barrientos et al., 2003) and to ensure compliance with existing national food safety regulations 16 and therefore to limit exposure to liability claims (Meuwissen et al., 2003; Fulponi, 2006) . A private B2B standard developed by a network of European retailers, GlobalGap successfully imposes its generic standards to a large number of suppliers throughout the world: over 102,000 producers in 108 countries were certified against the GlobalGap standard in 2010 17 . Ultimately, GlobalGap has become a "regulatory foundation"
for international trade in agro-food products (Neilson and Pritchard, 2009 ). The transition from B2C to B2B standards may be yet another engine for the watering down of standards, by subordinating (weak) sustainable development principles to more stringent food safety standards. Finally, watering down also shows through the growing importance of third-party certification: the ability to report and document is becoming the key performance factor (and a major cause of exclusion within supply chains), to the point where making things auditable (through guidelines, routines, and certification standards) becomes more important than the content of the standard itself (Power, 1997) . The lack of reference to farmer prices; the growing importance of B2B initiatives that confine sustainability standards to the organisation of the supply chain; the deep asymmetries in transparency required between farmers and TNCs; and auditability becoming more valued than sustainability itself are the most salient signs of this process of watering down.
By systematizing the use of the instruments promoted by the organic and fair trade movements (i.e. harmonized technical specifications for the production process and certification), sustainability standards give further impulse to the process of commoditisation.
Indeed, the involvement -through collective action -of a large variety of actors in the definition of sustainability standards provides the opportunity to create a unique reference for the mainstream market. This movement is facilitated by the watering down of the principles of sustainable development: by making all farmers potential applicants for certification, sustainablility standards reintroduce competition at a global level.
Conclusion: sustainability standards, commoditisation and development
The commoditisation process of agricultural products may be traced back to the creation of standards, first in close relation with futures markets and later supported by national governments. Table 3 summarises our interpretation of the historical evolution of standards, based on the criteria of substitutability, transparency and collective action, developed throughout the paper.
Initially aimed at organizing low-cost supplier substitutability at both the country and the farm levels, "old standards" incorporated little information, limited to the intrinsic attributes of the products (colour, taste, size, cleanliness, etc.). By doing so, they deliberately ignored or even hid more information regarding the characteristics of both the production process (child labour, use of pesticides, etc.) and the local marketing conditions (price, credit, intermediaries). This was a very condition of substitutability and a historically dated one.
Although the issue of transparency is not explicitly considered when looking at commoditisation, the introduction of a certain degree of opacity along the chain has been a component of the historical process of commoditisation. In a certain way, by focusing on the intrinsic attributes of the product, historical standards drew a curtain on the production process at the farm level. De-commoditisation is a key result of the historical fair trade and organic movements: strong vertical relations isolated sustainable products by differentiating the whole chains from the mainstream market. These chains promoted close relationships and inter-knowledge between consumers and clearly identifiable, non-anonymous producers. The aim was clearly to sweep aside supplier substitutability. Contestation of the commoditisation process was mainly achieved by reintroducing transparency along the chain, i.e. by linking together the consumer and the producer.
We defend the idea that the definition of common standards and the adoption of third party certification in the 1990s, to monitor compliance with organic and fair trade standards brought this trend toward de-commoditisation to an end. Furthermore, we consider that the process of re-commoditisation of agricultural products on the basis of sustainability standards is on its way. Indeed, the creation of shared and explicit standards backed by certification procedures -first for organic and fair trade products and then for sustainable products -enabled to achieve simultaneously transparency and substitutability… thus leading back to commoditisation.
With sustainability standards, what is at stake is the emergence for each product of one global hegemonic standard incorporating sustainability issues and used by all actors of the value chain. This shows through the growing importance of multistakeholder initiatives aimed at defining a single standard for the market. Such hegemonic standards guarantee substitutability at the world level between suppliers (i.e. farmers); reintroduce perfect competition in the market while guaranteeing transparency within the chain. Of course, this process is both incomplete and fragile and is threatened by the space for contestation opened by the watering down of the original principles supported by the fair trade and organic initiatives. Very few studies document the impact of sustainability standards on the distribution of value between the different stages of the commodity chain, although this issue became central in the development debate as soon as the 1990s 18 . Several studies show that this share has tended to decline over the past 30 years (Morisset, 1997; Oxfam, 2002; Green, 2005; Kaplinsky, 2006) .
Moreover, recent studies emphasize higher inequalities in the distribution of value within certified chains (fair trade and organic), as compared to conventional ones (Calo and Wise, 2005; Daviron and Ponte, 2005; Forero-Madero et al., 2006; Roquigny et al., 2008; Zehner, 2004) . According to Daviron and Ponte (2005) , this can be explained by the opportunity given to downstream actors (e.g. retailers) to value the symbolic attributes associated with their products (environmental friendliness, concern for social issues, etc.), attributes that lie at the core of value creation in today's consumer markets 19 . Beside these limited attempts aiming a rebalancing the distribution of value within the chain what is really at stake is the inclusion of this issue in the agenda of "big" round tables (RSPO, RTRS, BSI, 4Cs) that are supposed to elaborate universal (or hegemonic) standards. This evolution would need a better representation of governments and producer organisations in these initiatives. 
70s-80s 1990s 2000s
Source: Kolk (2005) et les auteurs. 
